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COMMENTS
THE LAST PLANTATION:
WILL EMPLOYMENT REFORM
COME TO CAPITOL HILL?
Copyright, 1978, G.B. Trudeau/distributed by Universal Press Syndicate
Nearly half a century has passed since most American workers were
guaranteed the right to bargain with employers over the terms and condi-
tions of their employment.' Recognizing the need for employment safe-
guards, Congress has enacted a wave of labor reforms establishing
1. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151 to 166 (1976). Enacted in 1935, the
National Labor Relations Act was designed to eliminate obstructions to the free flow of
commerce by encouraging collective bargaining and protecting workers' freedom of associa-
tion to negotiate the terms and conditions of their employment. Id § 151.
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minimum wages, 2 equal pay,3 and health and safety standards,4 as well as
protections against discrimination in hiring and promotions.5 In 1972, ex-
tension of equal employment opportunity laws to previously exempted
federal employees 6 assured that they would no longer be "second class citi-
zens, '7 and that the federal government would be a "model of equal em-
ployment opportunity."8 Federal employees working for the United States
Congress, however, did not receive this extended coverage, and to this day
they remain outside the ambit of every employment protection statute.
The failure of Congress to adhere to the strict employment standards it
prescribed for the rest of the country became the focus of national atten-
tion in 1974. It was revealed that the Congressional Placement Office reg-
ularly accepted discriminatory job requests from the offices of members of
Congress. Typical requests specified that applicants "must be young," or
directed that "no blacks, .... no women," or "no Spanish-surnamed" need
apply.9 When newspapers across the country ran stories about the blatant
2. Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 to 219 (1976). Congress sought to
prevent "labor conditions detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum standard of living
necessary for health, efficiency, and [the] general well-being of workers" through the estab-
lishment of minimum wages and maximum hours for the work week. Id at §§ 202, 206,
207.
3. Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1976). Under the Act, employers are prohibited
from discriminating on the basis of sex for work requiring equal skill, effort, and responsibil-
ity. Id
4. Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651 to 678 (1976). Congress
sought to assure every working person in the nation safe and healthy working conditions.
ld at §§ 65 1(b), 654.
5. The Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976), made it unlawful for an
employer either to discharge, refuse to hire, or to otherwise discriminate against any individ-
ual with respect to terms or conditions of employment because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin. Id at § 2000-2(a)(1). See also The Age Discrimina-
tion in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976), which forecloses arbitrary age dis-
crimination in employment by prohibiting an employer from discharging or refusing to hire
an individual based upon age. Id. at § 623(a). Discrimination in compensation, terms, condi-
tions, or privileges of employment was also outlawed. Id
6. The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (1976), pro-
vides that the federal government shall not discriminate with respect to race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin. Id. Federal government employees were excluded from the original
Civil Rights Act of 1964 because the United States was excluded from the definition of
"employer." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1976).
7. 118 CONG. REC. 4922 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Williams).
8. Id at 4929 (remarks of Sen. Cranston).
9. An investigative reporter for the Fort Worth Star Telegram discovered that at least
nineteen representatives and one senator made discriminatory requests. See Wash. Post,
Aug. 18, 1974, § A, at 1, col. 2. It also was learned that placement office employees were
instructed to place a "B" on employment forms of black job applicants. See Wash. Post,
Aug. 24, 1974, § A, at 3, col. 2. An investigation by the Joint Committee on Congressional
Operations revealed a total of 48 job orders containing notations of exclusionary preferences
or instructions. 120 CONG. REc. S22386 (daily ed. 1974) (remarks of Sen. Metcalf).
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job discrimination on Capitol Hill, Congress put an end to the placement
office's practice. Nevertheless, subsequent investigations by congressional
committees revealed that job discrimination on Capitol Hill was closer to
the rule, rather than the exception.' 0 Recently, the Fifth Circuit com-
pounded the problems arising from the lack of statutory employment pro-
tections for Hill workers when it ruled that a congressional employee who
alleged a prima facie case of employment discrimination under the fifth
amendment was not entitled to a damage remedy. I I
The exclusion of congressional employees from the fair employment
laws raises complex constitutional questions under the speech or debate
and the equal protection clauses. Given the uniquely vulnerable status of
these employees and the constitutional issues raised by attempts to regulate
the activities of the legislative branch, this article will examine the problem
of employment discrimination on Capitol Hill, focusing upon alternatives
which afford congressional employees greater employment protections.
Any approach to the exclusion problem must first determine whether the
doctrines of separation of powers and legislative immunity bar or restrict
an inquiry into the employment practices of an allegedly offending mem-
ber. Additionally, the parameters of congressional immunity must be ex-
amined to define those circumstances under which members of Congress
are traditionally held accountable by law for certain types of misconduct.
Finally, current and potentially available remedies will be explored in an
attempt to provide a means of redress for victims of congressional employ-
ment discrimination.
I. THE SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM
The lack of detailed and accurate information on congressional employ-
ment practices is, in itself, a reflection of the employment problem on Cap-
itol Hill. Members of Congress are not required to keep employment
records. Employees can be hired and fired at will, thereby inhibiting those
willing to come forward with information. Nevertheless, in the past four
years several investigations and studies have provided sufficient data to
illustrate the severity of the problem.
An independent study of Capitol Hill employment practices by the Cap-
itol Hill Women's Political Caucus disclosed the absence of uniform job
10. See generally Handling of Discrimination Complaints in the Senate: Hearings Before
the Senate Comm. on Government Affairs, Parts I and II, 95th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. (1977-
78) [hereinafter cited as Discrimination Hearings, Part I or 1] and HOUSE COMMISSION ON
ADMINISTRATION REVIEW, ADMINISTRATIVE REORGANIZATION AND LEGISLATIVE MAN-
AGEMENT, H.R. Doc. No. 95-232, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 81-122 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
OBEY COMMISSION REPORT]. See also notes 12-14 and 16-18 infra.
11. Davis v. Passman, 571 F.2d 793 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 99 S. Ct. 308 (1978).
1979]
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standards in congressional offices. 12 Since no uniform policies exist for
Congress as an institutional employer, job descriptions, salary scales, and
leave policies vary widely and are set by no one except the individual
member, and only if he or she so chooses. 13 As a result, the duties and
salary associated with a job title vary greatly from office to office. While
these variations make generalizations difficult, the Women's Caucus was
able to demonstrate significant disparaties in salaries among men and wo-
men employees. After comparing more than two thousand full-time em-
ployees, the Caucus found the median salary of women to be more than
seven thousand dollars lower than the median salary for males. Although
the gap narrowed when comparing salaries above $18,000, on the whole,
the median salary for women remained consistently lower.14
This pattern of relegating women to lower salaried positions, or com-
pensating women with salaries lower than men employed in the same posi-
tions, was confirmed by a report of the House Commission on
Administrative Review, the "Obey Commission."' 15 The Obey Commis-
sion analyzed salary distribution by job title and found that women em-
12. Sexists in the Senate? .4 Study of Doferences in Salary by Sex Among Employees in
the United States Senate, prepared by the Capitol Hill Women's Political Caucus, reprinted in
Discrimination Hearings, Part 1, supra note 10, at 44-71 [hereinafter cited as Sexists in the
Senate]. The Caucus concluded that there were four positions having commonly under-
stood responsibilities: administrative assistant, legislative assistant, press secretary, and case
worker. Id at 46. The Obey Commission, in its investigation of House employment prac-
tices, concurred with the Caucus' overall finding that job titles were unreliable. OBEY COM-
MISSION REPORT, supra note 10, at 96. In some offices, for example, the office manager is the
head clerical employee, while in others he or she may perform administrative and substan-
tive duties normally associated with the position of administrative assistant. Id
13. See generally OBEY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 10, at 81. There are, however,
some guidelines regarding employment on House committee staffs. This results from the
fact that unlike the situation with regard to individual members, there is specific statutory
authority for some aspects of committee employment. 2 U.S.C. § 72(a) (1976). The House
Committee on the District of Columbia, for example, has detailed provisions regarding staff
appointments, duties, and wages. HOUSE SELECT COMM. ON CONGRESSIONAL OPERATIONS,
95TH CONG., IST SESS., RULES ADOPTED BY THE COMMITTEES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRE-
SENTATIVES 65-67 (Comm. Print 1977). Moreover, several House committees have person-
nel policies regarding job descriptions, salary scales, performance evaluations, and
affirmative action. See OBEY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 10, at 108, Table 22. In
contrast, a review of Senate committee rules discloses only three committees having rules
relating to staff employment (Foreign Relations, Ethics, and Intelligence), and in each case
these rules are directed at the staffs' duties, particularly their duty to remain non-partisan.
SENATE COMM. ON RULES AND ADMINISTRATION, 95TH CONG., IST SESS., RULES ADOPTED
BY COMMITTEES OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE 49-52, 88-89, 115-17 (Comm. Print 1977).
14. Sexists in the Senate, supra note 12, at 64. The Caucus acknowledged that the study
was limited by noncomparability of job titles and lack of data concerning educational level
and experience of employees. Nevertheless, its findings showed that the median salary of
women employees was $10,260 compared to $17,670 for men. Salaries above $18,000 re-
flected a median salary for women of $22,627 and $28,091 for men. Id
15. OBEY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 10, at 117. The Obey Commission, chaired
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ployed in professional positions as administrative assistants, legislative
assistants, and press secretaries were invariably paid less than their male
counterparts. Ninety-one percent of women press secretaries drew salaries
below $20,000, while only fifty-three percent of men in the same job cate-
gory earned less than $20,000.16
A survey by Cox Newspapers 17 produced equally dramatic figures on
racial employment discrimination. The survey revealed that among 340
employees earning more than $30,000 on the twenty-two House standing
committees, only fifteen, or four percent, were black. Of the hundreds of
professional level employees on the Senate's standing committees, only
eleven were black.' 8
These findings reflect only the situations of those persons directly em-
ployed by senators, representatives, or committees. Exclusion from em-
ployment law protection equally affects many congressional employees
who do not work directly for legislators. In the Senate, for example, the
Sergeant at Arms controls employment practices for the capitol police,
pages, janitors, and post office employees. The Secretary of the Senate sets
work conditions for the Parliamentarian, printing clerk, and staffs of the
document room, library, and the reporter of debates. The Architect of the
Capitol, who serves both the Senate and House, employs restaurant work-
ers as well as the congressional custodial force and the staff for the various
repair shops. 19 An analysis of employment policies of these organizations
noted that personnel practices run the gamut from being fairly regularized
by Rep. David R. Obey, was established in the wake of the congressional scandals to investi-
gate and recommend improvement in House administrative operations and services.
16. Id at 96, Table 11. The Commission noted generally that at the lower end of the
salary range - $20,000 and below - women outnumber men by as much as two to one. Id
at 86. Even when educational levels are equal, women earn less than men. Id at 89. Al-
though the Commission cautioned against interpreting this data as concrete evidence of dis-
crimination, it acknowledged that some significant portion of the variation in salary levels is
caused by racial and sexual considerations. Id at 89, 97. In terms of sheer numbers, the
Commission found that "[alpproximately 90% of staff directors, general counsels and com-
mittee staff legislative and professional assistants are male. In contrast, 98% of the clerical
staffs are female." Id at 104.
17. Alexander, Discrimination in Hiring and Pay Starts at the Top. . . On Capitol Hill,
reprinted in Discrimination Hearings, supra note 10, Part I, at 3-6.
18. Id See also a survey by the Ad Hoc Committee of Black Senate Legislative Staff,
estimating that of 1,100 Senate professionals on both the personal staffs of Senators and
committee staffs, less than 30 are black. Discrimination Hearings, supra note 10, Part I, at 34
(testimony of Alan G. Boyd and Loftus C. Carson II).
19. A COMPILATION OF PAPERS PREPARED FOR THE COMMISSION ON THE OPERATION
OF THE SENATE, 94TH CONG., 2d SESS., SENATE ADMINISTRATION 72-84 (Comm. Print
1976). The Commission was created to examine, inter alia, strategies for Senate manage-
ment improvement, personnel practices and policies, fiscal management and accounting,
and printing procedures. The Commission's mandate was to identify particular problems
and potential improvements in overall Senate administration. Id at 1-2.
1979]
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and formalized to casual word-of-mouth administration. 20 The report
concluded that it was "tantamount to a double standard for the Senate to
pass on laws requiring certain types of personnel practices for the remain-
der of the federal government, while, in effect, exempting themselves."
2
'
Although the public record is devoid of concrete reasons for congres-
sional exemption from the fair employment laws, 22 some suggest that
elected officials have a peculiar need for political compatibility and loyalty
from their staffs.23 More commonly, it is argued that application of the
employment laws to the legislature would result in a serious breach of leg-
islative immunity and would create separation of powers problems of a
constitutional dimension. 24 Furthermore, the Constitution grants Con-
gress exclusive authority to govern its internal affairs.25
II. THE SPEECH OR DEBATE CLAUSE: THE EVOLVING DOCTRINE OF
LEGISLATIVE IMMUNITY
Separation of powers, the doctrine implicit in the tripartite structure of
our federal government, is rooted in the political philosophies of Plato,
Aristotle, and Montesquieu. 26 In search of the secret of good government,
Plato advocated a "mixed state" to assure practical stability.27 Aristotle
proposed three levels of political functions: the deliberative, magisterial,
20. Id at 69. Personnel practices and policies of the three largest organizations provid-
ing services to the Senate were analyzed for the Commission by Samuel Louis Walsh. After
extensively interviewing supervisors and administrators within the three offices, he con-
cluded that employment practices are not uniform. Id at 68-69. The Capitol Police office,
for example, has instituted many conventional components of a formal personnel system,
including position descriptions, competitive recruitment, and periodic performance evalua-
tions. Id at 74. On the other hand, personnel practices within the office of the Secretary of
the Senate are rather informal. There are no performance appraisal systems, detailed posi-
tion descriptions, or statements of delegated authority. Id at 79.
21. Id at 88.
22. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, EQUAL EMPLOY-
MENT OPPORTUNITY AND THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS 1 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
CRS EMPLOYMENT STUDY].
23. It is suggested that members require a great deal of flexibility in choosing and work-
ing with their staffs and that the nature of the institution necessitates personally and politi-
cally compatible staffs. OBEY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 10, at 81. Moreover, loyalty
to the employing member is a key characteristic of the working environment in member
offices. Id at 82. See generally 36 CONG. Q. 337 (1978).
24. See note 74 infra.
25. The Constitution provides that "[e]ach House may determine the Rule of its Pro-
ceedings, punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the Concurrence of two
thirds, expel a Member." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2. See generally notes 78 and 113 infra.
26. A. VANDERBILT, THE DOCTRINE OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS AND ITS PRESENT
DAY SIGNIFICANCE 38 (1953).
27. See generally PLATO, STATESMAN AND LAWS IN THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES
1018, 1225 (Hamilton & Cairns ed. 1961).
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and judicative. 28 It was Montesquieu, however, who first conceived of the
three functions of government exercised by three distinct organs, each jux-
taposed against the others.29
Embracing Montesquieu's philosophy, Articles I, II, and III of the Con-
stitution vest powers in the legislative, executive, and judicial branches. In
the exercise of the powers assigned to them severally, the three branches of
government operate harmoniously and independently of each other; action
by one branch in the lawful exercise of its powers is not subject to control
by the others.30 It is apparent from the face of the Constitution that the
legislative branch was intended to be well-insulated from encroachment by
the other branches of government.31
Members of the legislative branch are afforded a variety of privileges
and immunities by the Constitution. They are shielded from arrest while
attending or traveling to and from a session of either House, except in
cases of "Treason, Felony and Breach of Peace."' 32 It is further provided
that "for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be question-
ed in any other Place. '' 33 The Congress is also given power to "determine
the Rules of its Proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly behavior,
and, with the Concurrence of two thirds, expel a Member."' 34 This lan-
guage grants Congress broad rule-making power for governing its internal
operations, and thus suggests that the drafters of the Constitution intended
Congress to have exclusive authority to resolve controversies unique to the
legislative branch.35 The three clauses, taken together, provide a broad
protection for the legislature in its dealings with the executive and the judi-
ciary.
The speech or debate clause serves not only as the basis for the doctrine
of legislative immunity, but also as the mainstay of the separation of pow-
ers, insulating Congress in its relations with the other branches. 36 The
28. THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE 188-89 (E. Barker trans. 1946).
29. MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 173-86 (T. Nugent trans. 1873).
30. See Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629-30 (1935); O'Don-
oghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 530 (1933). Separation of powers is designed to pre-
clude a commingling of essentially different powers of government. Each department
should be kept completely independent to assure that its acts shall never be controlled by, or
subjected to, the coercive influence of either of the other departments. Id at 530.
31. See text accompanying notes 32-37 infra.
32. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1.
33. Id at cl. 2.
34. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2.
35. Gibbons, The Interdependence of Legitimacy." An Introduction to the Meaning ofthe
Separation of Powers, 5 SETON HALL L. REV. 435, 478 (1974).
36. JOINT COMMITTEE ON CONGRESSIONAL OPERATIONS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL IMMU-
NITY OF MEMBERS OF CONGRESS, S. REP. No. 93-896, 93d CONG., 2D SESS. 5 (1974) [herein-
after cited as CONSTITUTIONAL IMMUNITY REPORT]. See Suarez, Congressionallmmunity.'A
1979]
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clause protects Congress from two kinds of threats to its deliberative au-
tonomy: it blocks the use of grand jury investigations and criminal prose-
cutions by executive officials to question legislative acts, and it insures that
the legislators are neither distracted from nor hindered by challenges to
their individual legislative actions. 37 The language of Article I, section 6
was adopted following only brief debate and with no opposition. 38 Be-
cause the tradition of legislative privilege was firmly engrained in our con-
stitutional history, until recently the conduct of United States' legislators
was rarely questioned.
Early Supreme Court cases generally sustained a broad interpretation of
the speech or debate clause. In Kilbourn v. Thompson, 39 the first such case,
the Sergeant at Arms, pursuant to a House resolution, arrested Kilbourn, a
private citizen, and cited him for contempt for refusing to answer ques-
tions and furnish books and papers requested by Congress. After acquittal
of any alleged wrongdoing, Kilbourn sued the Speaker of the House, five
members, and the Sergeant at Arms for false imprisonment. The Court
found that while the House had improperly punished Kilbourn for con-
tempt, the legislators themselves were not liable for his false imprison-
ment.40 Although Kilbourn was permitted to proceed against the Sergeant
at Arms, he was denied legal recourse against the legislators on the
grounds that it would be a "narrow view of the constitutional provision to
limit [the clause] to words spoken in debate."' 4' Rather, the clause's pro-
Criticism of Existing Distinctions andA Proposalfor a New Definitional Approach, 20 VILL. L.
REV. 97, 142 (1974); Ervin, The Gravel and Brewster Cases- An Assault on Congressional
Independence, 59 VA. L. REv. 175, 176-77 (1973).
37. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 291 (1978).
38. United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 177 (1966). Until 1967, there had been only
four Supreme Court cases involving the speech or debate clause. Since then, there have
been five cases.
39. 103 U.S. 168 (1880).
40. Id at 204.
41. Id. The Court relied upon the early case of Coffin v. Coffin, 4 Mass. 9 (1808) as
"perhaps, the most authoritative case in this country on the construction of the provision in
regard to freedom of debate in legislative bodies," and cited extensively from that opinion.
Id Coffin involved a slander action against a member of the Massachusetts House of Repre-
sentatives for comments made in a passageway within the walls of the House. The Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts construed the privilege broadly to cover acts resulting from
the nature and in the execution of the office. Nevertheless, the Court applied the principal
narrowly and found that Coffin was not executing the duties of office or acting as a represen-
tative when he uttered the defamatory remarks. 4 Mass. 9, 31-32, 34 (1808). The court said
of the immunity:
These privileges are thus secured, not with the intention of protecting the members
against prosecutions for their own benefit, but to support the right of the People, by
enabling their representatives to execute the functions of their office without fear of
prosecution, civil or criminal.
103 U.S. at 203 citing 4 Mass. I [sic] (1808).
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tective shield was extended "to things generally done in a session of the
House by one of its members in relation to the business before it. ''42. This
phrase became the classic expression defining the scope of the privilege.
43
A state legislature's investigation of subversive activities was found pro-
tected by the privilege in Tenney v. Brandhove.44 Quoting James Wilson, a
member of the Constitutional Convention responsible for drafting the
clause, the Court reasoned that legislators "should be protected from the
resentment of everyone, however powerful, to whom the exercise of [the
liberty of speech] may occasion offense."'45 The claim of an unworthy pur-
pose in the conduct of a legislative hearing, the Court noted, did not de-
stroy the privilege that immunizes legislators from deterrents to the
uninhibited discharge of their legislative duty.
46
Relying on Kilbourn and Tenney, the Court again broadly read the
scope of the privilege in United States v. Johnson.47 Johnson, a former
congressman, had been convicted for violating a federal conflict of interest
statute and for conspiring to defraud the United States.48 In affirming the
reversal of the conspiracy conviction, the Supreme Court declared that the
intensive judicial inquiry, made in the course of a prosecution by the exec-
utive branch under a general conspiracy statute, violated the express lan-
guage of the speech or debate clause. The essence of the charge was that
the Congressman's conduct was improperly motivated. This, however,
was precisely what the clause generally foreclosed from executive or judi-
cial inquiry.49
Finally, in Dombrowski v. Eastland50 and Powell v. McCormack,51 the
42. 103 U.S. at 204-05.
43. See, e.g., United States v.. Johnson, 383 U.S. at 179, United States v. Brewster, 408
U.S. 501, 509 (1972).
44. 341 U.S. 367 (1951). A committee of the California State Legislature summoned a
witness to reappear before the committee following his circulation of a petition urging mem-
bers of the legislature not to appropriate further funds for the committee. The witness ap-
peared but refused to give further testimony and was cited for contempt.
45. 341 U.S. at 373, quoting II WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 38 (Andrews ed. 1896).
46. 341 U.S. at 377.
47. 383 U.S. 169 (1966).
48. 337 F.2d 180 (D.C. Cir. 1964). The court found that the government's charge that
Johnson conspired to make a speech was barred by the speech or debate clause. Id at 189-
90.
49. 383 U.S. at 177, 180. In its prosecution, the government's conspiracy theory de-
pended upon a showing that a particular speech was made not as a congressman prepares or
delivers an ordinary speech, but rather primarily to serve private interests. The Court de-
clared that however reprehensible it might be for a member to abuse his position by conspir-
ing to give a particular speech for remuneration from private interests, the key to the charge
was that the conduct (the speech) was improperly motivated. Id
50. 387 U.S. 82 (1967).
51. 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
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Court reaffirmed the traditional view that actions falling within the
"sphere of legitimate legislative activity" should be protected. In
Dombrowski, an actirl for unlawful seizure of private papers was dis-
missed against a senator. The Court concluded that his use of the papers
during hearings was within the sphere of legitimate legislative activities.52
Likewise, in Powell, action taken by members of the 90th Congress to ex-
clude Representative Adam Clayton Powell was held to be privileged from
judicial review by the speech or debate clause.5 3 Both holdings embraced
the view that legislators should be protected not only from the results of
litigation, but also from the burden of defending themselves. The purpose
of the protection, stated the Court, was "to insure that legislators are not
distracted from or hindered in the performance of their legislative tasks by
being called into court to defend their actions. 54
The scope of legislative immunity was discernably narrowed in the
Court's next three opinions addressing the privilege issue.55 In United
States v. Brewster, 6 a district court dismissed a bribery indictment against
Senator Daniel B. Brewster on legislative immunity grounds. The
Supreme Court conceded that the clause protected members of Congress
from inquiry into their legislative acts or the motivation behind them, but
declared that the clause was never regarded "as protecting all conduct
relating to the legislative process. '57 Accordingly, Senator Brewster was
denied protection from prosecution on bribery charges.58 Moreover, the
52. Plaintiff sued the chairman and staff for allegedly conspiring with state officials to
unlawfully seize his private papers. The evidence indicated possible involvement of the staff
in the raid by state officials. In contrast, the senator's participation was limited to receiving
the papers for use during his legislative investigation. The Court held that a cause of action
had been stated against the staff, but not the senator, since his use of the papers during
hearings was protected within the sphere of legitimate legislative activities. 387 U.S. at 84-
85. Had the senator participated in the raid, a non-legislative function, it is likely that he
would have been unprotected.
53. Following his exclusion from the 90th Congress, Representative Adam Clayton
Powell and voters from his congressional district brought an action against the Speaker,
other members, and House officers, charging that the House action had been unconstitu-
tional. One of the arguments posed by the respondent House members and officers was that
judicial review of their action was foreclosed by the speech or debate clause. As in Kilbourn
and Dombrowski, the Court held that although the congressmen were protected by the
clause, the petitioners were entitled to maintain their action against House employees. 395
U.S. at 504-06.
54. Id at 505.
55. CONSTITUTIONAL IMMUNITY REPORT, supra note 36, at 24.
56. 408 U.S. 501 (1972).
57. d. at 515 (emphasis in original).
58. Id at 528-29. See note 130 infra. But see 408 U.S. at 551 (White, J., Douglas, J.,
and Brennan, J., dissenting). The dissentors refused to distinguish between the legislative
act of voting, which was admittedly protected, and the promise to be influenced in voting,
which the majority considered outside the protection from inquiry. The dissentors felt the
[Vol. 28:271
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Court characterized various "entirely legitimate" activities engaged in by
members in discharging their official functions as "political" rather than
legislative in nature and not entitled to legislative immunity. 9
Gravel v. United States,60 decided the same day as Brewster, involved a
subpoena of Senator Gravel's aide by a federal grand jury investigating
matters relating to public disclosure of the "Pentagon Papers. ' 61 Senator
Gravel moved to intervene in an action brought by the aide to quash the
subpoena. The Senator contended that questioning the aide would contra-
vene the speech or debate clause. The Court extended legislative immu-
nity to officers and employees of the legislative body for activities that
would be protected if performed by the legislator.62 The Court defined
legislative activity in part as those acts comprising "an integral part of the
deliberative and communicative process."'63 Distinguishing its decisions in
Kilbourn, Dombrowski, and Powell where employees were held liable for
actions directed by their congressional employers, the Court extended
Brewster by declaring that had a senator or representative performed the
challenged activity in those cases, he or she would also have been held
liable. 64 Brewster and Gravel thus established the principle that the speech
or debate clause privileges neither a member of Congress nor an aide to
violate a valid criminal law in preparation for or implementation of legis-
majority ignored the vital difference between executive authority to prosecute for ordinary
crimes and the power to challenge undertakings or conspiracies to corrupt the legislative
process. For example, in a prosecution for drunken driving or assault, the manner in which
a congressman performed his legislative tasks is quite irrelevant to either the prosecution or
the defense. Id at 560-61.
59. Id at 512. See notes 102-03 and accompanying text infra.
60. 408 U.S. 606 (1972).
61. At a meeting of the Senate Public Works Committee's Subcommittee on Public
Buildings and Grounds, Chairman Mike Gravel read portions of the Pentagon Papers into
the record. These papers contained a classified Defense Department study entitled a History
of the United States Decision-Making Process on Viet Nam Policy. Arrangements were
subsequently made for publication of the record by Beacon Press, a private, non-profit pub-
lishing house. A federal grand jury investigating matters relating to the public disclosure of
the papers subpoenaed the senator's aide.
62. 408 U.S. at 618.
63. Id at 625. But see In re Grand Jury Investigation into Possible Violations of Title
18, 47 U.S.L.W. 2292 (3d Cir. Nov. 7, 1978). The Third Circuit held that a Congressman has
immunity against evidentiary use of telephone charge records. Relying on Gravel, the court
found the records as well as the calls themselves to be part of the "deliberative and commu-
nicative processes." Id, quoting Gravel v. United States 408 U.S. 606 (1972).
64. 408 U.S. at 621. The Court stated that no prior case had extended immunity to
members of Congress who individually executed an invalid resolution carrying out an illegal
arrest, or to those who seized the property or invaded the privacy of a citizen in order to
secure information for a hearing. In the Court's view, such acts are not more essential to
legislating than the conduct held unprotected in United States v. Johnson. Id
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lative acts.65
In Doe v. McMillan,66 the Court stressed the need for some "reasonable
bounds" to determine the scope of immunity for legislative acts. As had
several prior cases, Doe involved the protection available to non-members
performing legislative functions.67 The Court held that the clause limits
immunization for congressional employees who publish and distribute
otherwise actionable materials to the "reasonable requirements of the leg-
islative function. '68 Justice White found that these requirements were sat-
isfied by distribution of congressional material within the Congress. In
this case, public distribution of a report went beyond those reasonable re-
quirements, and thus the defendant printers were not afforded legislative
immunity.69
In the most recent application of the speech or debate clause, Eastland v.
United States Serviceman's Fund,70 a private organization sought to enjoin
the issuance of a congressional subpoena.7' Relying on Gravel, the Court
stated that the activities would have to be "an integral part of the delibera-
tive and communicative process" in order to activate the clause's absolute
bar to interference. 72 Issuance of the subpoena was held essential to legis-
lating. Consequently, while the Constitution continues to immunize legis-
lators from challenges to certain legislative acts, the conduct meriting this
protection is no longer all-encompassing.
65. Id at 621-22. Members of Congress are not only accountable when they violate a
criminal law, but may also be accountable when they violate certain civil statutes. See note
129 infra.
66. 412 U.S. 306 (1973).
67. Id at 315-16. Plaintiffs, parents of District of Columbia students, sued the Chair-
man of the House District Committee, committee members and staff, the Superintendant of
Documents, Public Printer, and others, alleging that a committee report contained deroga-
tory information concerning named students. The Court found that the members and staff
of the committee had done nothing more than "conduct hearings, prepare the report, and
authorize its publication." Id. at 318. Therefore, the complaint as to them had been prop-
erly dismissed. Id at 317-20.
68. Id. at 315-16.
69. Id at 315-18.
70. 421 U.S. 491 (1975).
71. The issue was whether a federal court may enjoin issuance of a congressional sub-
poena directing a bank to produce the records of an organization claiming a first amend-
ment privilege. The United States Serviceman's Fund (USSF) was a nonprofit membership
organization having a reputation as the focus of military dissent during the Vietnam war. In
seeking the injunction, the USSF alleged that the sole purpose of the congressional investi-
gation was to force public disclosure of private beliefs and to harass the USSF membership,
thereby chilling their exercise of first amendment rights.
72. Id at 504.
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III. CONGRESSIONAL EXEMPTION FROM THE EMPLOYMENT LAWS
The Supreme Court, in interpreting the speech or debate clause, has ac-
knowledged the need to properly insulate the legislature and preserve a
separation of powers. At the same time, however, it has recognized that
not every act performed by a legislator requires protection from inquiry.
Notwithstanding the restraints the Court has recently imposed on the priv-
ilege, Congress continues to warn of the separation of powers problems
resulting from inquiry into its affairs, 73 and has explicitly cited this con-
cern to justify its exemption from the fair employment laws. 74 In the Con-
gress' view, enforcement of these laws by the executive and judiciary
would encourage exactly the kind of intrusion into its internal affairs from
which it believes itself immune under the separation of powers doctrine. It
is argued, moreover, that congressional aides are "alter egos" of their legis-
lator-employers, and as such, the legislator's conduct with respect to these
aides may not be questioned.
75
Until the congressional employment scandals of recent years, little, if
any, attention was focused on the exclusion of congressional employees
from job protection laws.7 6 To date, neither congressional body has estab-
lished mandatory grievance procedures for its employees. Despite the
73. CONSTITUTIONAL IMMUNITY REPORT, supra note 36, at 29. Senator Fulbright
stressed that judicial restraint in reviewing allegations of congressional impropriety was en-
tirely consistent with the doctrine of separation of powers. Id Senator Ervin implied that
the separation of powers concept and the speech or debate clause required that inquiry into
congressional behavior remain the exclusive responsibility of the legislative branch. Id
74. The Obey Commission Report stated, "[b]ecause of restrictions implied by the doc-
trine of separation of power," employees of the Congress were excluded from coverage
under various employment laws." OBEY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 10, at 98-99.
Congressional employees are excluded, for example, from the Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Act, the Fair Labor Standards Act, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, all
of which extend coverage only to federal government employees in the legislative and judi-
cial branches of the federal government who have positions in the competitive service. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a); 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(2)(A)(iii) (1976); 29 U.S.C. § 633a(a) (1976). The
"competitive service" consists mostly of civil service positions in the executive branch. Sev-
eral non-executive branch and D.C. government positions are included in the competitive
service by statute. 5 U.S.C. § 2102(a) (1976). No statute designates congressional employees
as members of the competitive service.
75. The "alter-ego" argument stems from the Supreme Court's holding in Gravel that
aides are entitled to legislative immunity for legislative acts which would render a member
immune. If aides are so important to a member's ability to function that they are given
coextensive legislative immunity, it is argued, the decision by a member to hire or fire an
aide is as central a legislative function as a decision to support or oppose legislation. Brief
for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 4, Davis v. Passman, 544 F.2d 865 (5th Cir. 1977).
Cf. Casenote 46 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 137, 149 (1977) (the relevant inquiry remains whether
the firing of an aide is a legislative act, not whether the aide is important to the member's
discharge of duties).
76. See, e.g., Wash. Post, July 25, 1976, § C, at I, col. 4; Wash. Post, Aug. 1, 1976, § A,
at 4, col. 2.
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Obey Commission's investigation into employment inequities, none of its
recommendations pertaining to employment practices have been
adopted.77
Some small steps in the direction of greater job protection for congres-
sional employees have been taken within the past two years, however. The
House has adopted a rule forbidding employment discrimination. 78 Al-
though the rule is a positive step, it lacks enforcement mechanisms, with-
out which the situation for most employees remains unchanged. A
number of House members have also signed a voluntary House Fair Em-
ployment Practice Agreement. 79 The Agreement establishes a voluntary
fair employment practices panel composed of three representatives and
three staff members to investigate complaints from employees or potential
employees of those members who have signed the nondiscrimination
pledge. The most the panel can do if it believes a complaint is justified,
however, is recommend remedial action to the member. Although signa-
tory members say they will abide by the panel's recommendations, they
are merely required to accept or reject the Committee's action in writing.80
Currently, the only other recourse for House employees alleging dis-
crimination is to file a formal complaint with the House Ethics Committee.
The Committee will only accept a complaint directly from an employee if
three members of the House have refused to file it for him or her. The
complaint must be in writing and made under oath. Upon receipt of a
formal complaint, the Committee will conduct a preliminary investigation.
Following its investigation and upon the approval of a majority of its
77. OBEY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 10, at 115-20. The Commission had pro-
posed a plan to redesign the Congressional Placement Office, requiring it to establish an
affirmative action recruitment program as well as a procedure to handle employee griev-
ances. It further recommended that the House establish a fair employment practices panel
to assist in enforcing anti-discrimination rules.
78. Clause 9 of the House Code of Official Conduct, House Rule XLIII (43) provides
that:
A Member, officer or employee of the House of Representatives shall not discharge
or refuse to hire any individual, or otherwise discriminate against any individual
with respect to compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, be-
cause of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
The Rule was adopted as part of H.R. Res. 5, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG. REC. 33
(1975). House and Senate rules do not have the force and effect of law, although a member,
officer, or employee found guilty of a violation may be reprimanded, censured, or expelled.
See also note 114 infra.
79. U.S. House of Representatives, House Fair Employment Practices Agreement. See
also OBEY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 10, at 99.
80. Representative Henry Waxman declined to sign the Agreement after discussing the
matter with his staff. They felt that the Agreement was meaningless without an enforcement
mechanism. Other members have objected to the Agreement as tokenism, and, therefore,
regressive. See Isbell, Congress as 01'Massa, 4 Crv. LIB. REV. 46, 49 (1978).
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members, the Committee will recommend to the full House "such action
as it may deem appropriate in the circumstances. 81 Because this protec-
tion route has remained untried to date by any congressional employee, a
lack of faith in its efficacy can be inferred.
The Senate has adopted a rule similar to that of the House, prohibiting
employment discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, na-
tional origin, age, or physical handicap.82 Enacted as part of the Senate
Ethics Code, the rule's effective date was delayed for nearly two years until
January, 1979, with the understanding that the Senate would use the inter-
vening time to adopt a grievance procedure to enforce the rule. The Sen-
ate Governmental Affairs Committee held hearings on the issue and
reported a resolution establishing procedures to implement the rule in
April, 1978.83 The Resolution would establish a Fair Employment Rela-
tions Board to hear discrimination complaints and to supervise a Fair Em-
ployment Relations Office which would process discrimination complaints
and study present Senate personnel practices. After the Board made a de-
termination on a complaint, either party could appeal it to the Senate Eth-
ics Committee. 84 The Senate did not vote on the resolution during the
95th Congress; nevertheless, it is expected to be reintroduced in the 96th
Congress.85 The only other Senate remedial measure pending at the close
81. House Rule X, § 4(e)(2)(B). See generaly CRS EMPLOYMENT STUDY, supra note
22, at 11.
82. Senate Rule L (50) was adopted as part of a general ethics resolution, S. Res. 110,
95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. S5396 (daily ed. April 1, 1977). It provides that:
No Member, officer, or employee of the Senate shall:
(a) refuse to hire an individual;
(b) discharge an individual;
(c) discriminate against an individual on the basis of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, national origin, age, or state of physical handicap.
83. Discrimination Hearings, supra note 10; S. Res. 431, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 124 CONG.
REc. S5018 (daily ed. April 7, 1978). Representatives Patricia Schroeder and Morris Udall,
founders of the House Fair Employment Practices Agreements, plan to introduce a resolu-
tion similar to S. Res. 431 in the House during the next Congress. 36 CONG. Q. 2530 (1978).
84. S. Res. 431, supra note 83, at § 321.
85. See Wash. Post, Sept. 13, 1978, § A, at 2, col. 4; 36 CONG. Q. 2530 (1978); Wash.
Post, Sept. 27, 1978, § A, at 22, col. 1. The Senate Democratic Policy Committee decided
not to bring the resolution to a vote in the 95th Congress despite the fact that its passage was
assured. One supporter of the measure, Joseph Rauh, charged that the resolution had been
buried "solely for the reason that it would pass." 36 CONG. Q. 2530. In the last days of the
95th Congress, during Senate consideration of H.R. 50, the Full Employment and Balanced
Growth Act of 1978 (Humphrey-Hawkins), Senator Brooke offered S. Res. 431 as an amend-
ment to H.R. 50. 124 CONG. REc. S18206 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1978) (remarks of Senator
Brooke). After much heated debate on the merits of the resolution, as well as expressions of
concern about the amendment's posing a threat to the enactment of Humphrey-Hawkins,
Senator Brooks made what he characterized as a "painful and tragic" decision to withdraw
the amendment. 124 CONG. REc. S 18874 (daily ed., October 13, 1978) (remarks of Senator
Brooke).
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of the 95th Congress was S. 3086, a bill to extend coverage of all existing
employment laws to congressional employees.8 6 This measure was not
even considered by a committee and its chances for receiving any attention
in the 96th Congress while the more moderate resolution is available are
slim.
With the exception of S. 3086, every proposal under consideration pre-
serves for Congress most, if not all, authority for processing employee
grievances. The proposed Senate procedure, while establishing an in-
dependent Board, maintains final decision making authority in the Senate
Ethics Committee. The House voluntary grievance system permits mem-
bers to ignore the fair employment practices panel's recommendations.
This leaves the cumbersome Ethics Committee route as the only alterna-
tive. The limited extent of these "in-house" remedies has arguably been
justified by the separation of powers problems which could result should
Congress be subject to the employee protection remedies of existing law.8 7
A closer analysis of the current status of legislative immunity and an ex-
amination of those laws under which Congress traditionally is held ac-
countable, however, suggests that political and policy considerations alone
deny congressional employees the protection of current employment law.
IV. THE LIMITS OF LEGISLATIVE IMMUNITY
While speech or debate clause immunity is arguably an absolute legisla-
tive privilege, an examination of both its roots in English Parliamentary
history and the Supreme Court's interpretation of the clause illustrates the
limits of the type of conduct it will protect.
4. The Parameters of the Privilege
Legislative immunity is an outgrowth of the long struggle for parliamen-
tary supremacy in England.88 The speech or debate clause put an end to
the use successive monarchs had made of criminal and civil laws to sup-
press and intimidate critical legislators.8 9 The privilege was not created to
86. S. 3086, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. REC. S7567 (daily ed., May 16, 1978). This
bill would remove the congressional exemption from nine laws, including all the employ-
ment protection laws. Introducing the measure, Senator Leahy said, "[s]imple equity and
fairness demand passage of this legislation. It is time that we in Congress begin to live by
the same rules we have set for others. We should no longer allow such a double standard."
Id at 57523.
87. OBEY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 10, at 98-99.
88. Reinstein and Silverglate, Legislative Privilege and the Separation of Powers, 86
HARv. L. REV. 1113, 1120-21 (1973); Cella, The Doctrine of Legislative Privilege of Freedom
of Speech and Debate." Its Past, Present and Future as a Bar to Criminal Prosecutions in the
Courts, 2 SUFFOLK L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1968).
89. United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. at 178. For discussion of the historical roots of
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avoid private suits, but rather to prevent intimidation by the executive and
possible accountability to a hostile judiciary for actions taken by legislators
in discharging their official functions.90 While our history does not reflect
the catalog of executive abuses giving rise to the privilege in England, the
clause nonetheless was meant to assure the legislature wide freedom of
speech, debate, and deliberation. 9' Unlike the privilege in England, how-
ever, our clause, interpreted in light of the American experience, is
designed to preserve legislative independence, not supremacy. 92 Thus, it is
in keeping with the view that the powers assigned to the three branches of
our government also harness the power of each branch. The three
branches were not meant to be water-tight compartments. Rather it was
recognized that efficient operation of the federal government required that
each organization provide a check and balance on too great an acquisition
of power by another.
Legislative immunity does not bar all judicial review of legislative acts,
nor was it ever intended to do so. That issue was implicitly resolved as
early as 1803 in the landmark Marbury v. Madison93 decision. While it has
been suggested that the Congress alone has ultimate power to determine
the scope of its immunity under the speech or debate clause, it has been
established that the courts have exclusive power to interpret the Constitu-
tion and give meaning to the clause.94 Thus, in its first decision on the
subject of legislative immunity, Kilbourn v. Thompson, 95 the Supreme
Court noted that Congress' popular origin and "its ability to encroach on
the domain of a coordinate branch without arousing public distrust," ne-
cessitated careful review of congressional acts, particularly when those acts
are questioned by another tribunal.96 The Court cited with approval an
early Massachusetts case holding that the legality of congressional action is
properly subject to judicial scrutiny to determine whether its proceedings
the speech or debate clause, see generally Reinstein and Silverglate, supra note 88, at 1127;
Comment, The Constitutional Limits of the Speech or Debate Clause, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REV.
796, 798-99 (1978).
90. 383 U.S. at 181. See also Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term, 86 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 200 n.58 (1972).
91. United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. at 508. The Court noted, for example, that
nothing in our history was comparable to the practice of imprisoning a member of Parlia-
ment in the Tower without a hearing or meaningful recourse to a writ of habeas corpus.
Nevertheless, this difference, in the Court's opinion, did not detract from the framer's con-
cern for the independence of the legislative branch. Id.
92. Id See generally THE FEDERALIST Nos. 47-48 (J. Madison), 49-51 (A. Hamilton or
J. Madison).
93. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
94. See, e.g., discussion of judicial supremacy in note 198 and accompanying text infra.
95. 103 U.S. 168 (1880).
96. Id at 192.
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are in conformity with the Constitution and laws.97 The Court stressed
that it was not prepared to say that an "utter perversion of their powers to
a criminal purpose would be screened from punishment" under the free-
dom of debate privilege. 98 Nor has the Court hesitated to sustain private
individual rights when Congress has acted outside its legislative role.99
Even in Kilbourn and the other early cases broadly interpreting the privi-
lege, at least some qualification on the privilege was discussed, and the
Court specifically limited these early holdings to the facts of each case.100
The parameters of the privilege were further delineated in United States
v. Brewster.1° 1 The Court specifically described activities falling outside
speech or debate clause protection. These activities ranged from "errands"
performed for constituents to such tasks as making appointments with gov-
ernment agencies, assisting in securing government contracts, and prepar-
ing constituent newsletters, news releases, and speeches delivered outside
the Congress.' 0 2 Although the Court found these activities to be entirely
legitimate, it classified them as political activities, unrelated to the func-
tioning of the legislative process. 0 3 The Court did not imply as a corrol-
lary that everything "related" to the office of a member was shielded by
the clause. On the contrary, it read both Johnson and Kilbourn to protect
only those acts ordinarily performed in the process of enacting legisla-
tion. '04
In summary, nowhere has the Court viewed the speech or debate clause
as an insulation for all conduct relating to the legislative process. On the
97. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the "House of Representa-
tives is not the final judge of its own power and privileges in cases in which the rights and
liberties of the subject are concerned, but the legality of its action may be examined and
determined by this Court." Bumahm v. Morrissey, 80 Mass. (14 Gray) 226 (1856) quotedin
103 U.S. at 199.
98. 103 U.S. at 204-05.
99. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. at 376-77. The Court had gone so far as to indicate
there is a point at which a legislator's conduct so far exceeds the bounds of legislative power
that he may be held personally liable in a suit brought under the Civil Rights Act. Id at
379-80 (Black, J., concurring). For a discussion of the case, see note 44 supra.
100. Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. at 205; Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. at 379;
United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. at 185.
101. 408 U.S. 501 (1972).
102. Id at 512. See note 59 and accompapying text supra.
103. 408 U.S. at 512. See generally CONSTITUTIONAL IMMUNI Y REPORT, supra note 36,
and see casenote 46 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 137, 151 (1977), for the view that the Supreme
Court's "legislative or political" standard announced in Brewster and Gravel unrealistically
restricts members of Congress in the day-to-day activities of their office. See also Note The
Bribed Congressman's Immunityfrom Prosecution, 75 YALE L.J. 335, 346 (1965) (the speech
or debate clause should encompass all representative functions that a modem Congress per-
forms).
104. 408 U.S. at 513-14.
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contrary, in every case it has considered, the Court has limited application
of the clause to acts that are clearly a part of the legislative process. 0 5 The
clause was never intended to make members of Congress super-citizens.
In fact, this is exactly what Madison feared and what the Court discussed
in Kilbourn. The authors of the Constitution were cognizant of the history
of and need for the privilege, as well as the potential abuses which could
flow from overbroad safeguards. The privilege was written to protect
member behavior neither tolerated nor protected in private citizen action.
The shield, however, was not intended to protect more than the fundamen-
tal integrity of the legislative process. 106
Nevertheless, the absolute freedom members currently enjoy with re-
spect to their employees does precisely that; it places them above the law
and gives them power to do that which no other citizen may do - discrim-
inate at will. This extension of the privilege beyond its intended scope, its
literal language, and its history, is the type of legislative abuse that the
Supreme Court has specifically sought to foreclose.
Members of Congress both require and are entitled to loyal and politi-
cally compatible employees. These requirements, however, are not unique
to the legislature. Corporate executives and officials in the executive
branch require no less, yet are subject to employment laws. 107 Moreover,
while employment decisions undeniably are "related" to the functioning of
the legislative process, not everything related to the office of a member is
shielded by the privilege. Legislative privilege has been broadly defined to
apply to "anything done in a session of the House by one of its members in
relation to the business before it .... ,108 Logically, discriminatory em-
ployment practices should not be protected even under this expansive defi-
nition. Such practices are no more essential to legislating' 9 than receiving
a bribe is to voting. 0 The speech or debate clause does not prohibit in-
quiry into illegal conduct simply because it has some nexus to legislative
105. Id. at 515-16. "We would not think it sound or wise, simply out of an abundance of
caution to doubly insure legislative independence, to extend the privilege beyond its in-
tended scope, its literal language, and its history, to include all things in any way related to
the legislative process." Id.
106. Id at 517.
107. The loyalty argument urged by members of Congress is the same as that used by
private businessmen who opposed the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 36 CONG. Q. 337 (1978).
108. Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. at 203-04.
109. There is, however, the opposite point of view, maintaining that since congressional
aides are "alter egos" of their legislator-employers, the legislator's conduct with respect to
these aides may not be questioned. See Davis v. Passman, 544 F.2d 865, 882 (5th Cir. 1977)
(Jones, J., dissenting); Discrimination Hearings, supra note 10, at 330-34; and Brief for the
United States as Amicus Curiae at 4-5, Davis v. Passman, 544 F.2d 865 (5th Cir. 1977). See
also discussion in note 75 and accompanying text supra.
110. Bribery can perhaps be regarded as more closely related to the legislative process
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functions." ' Accordingly, conduct unprotected by the clause may be ex-
amined without giving rise to separation of powers problems. A member
of Congress thus may not only be questioned about certain "non-legisla-
tive" activities, but also may be held accountable by law.
B. Congressional Accountability
Members may be accountable for conduct exceeding the bounds of legit-
imate legislative activity and may even be arrested for violations of crimi-
nal law if proof of the illegal act is separable from legislative activity." 12
When inquiry into misconduct is proscribed by the speech or debate
clause, members may be accountable under internal House or Senate rules
of conduct. Under the constitutional "housekeeping" provision, 1 3 mem-
bers may be punished by censure or expulsion. The restraint Congress has
exercised in asserting these powers, however, has resulted in few instances
of punishment." 14
When members of Congress exceed the bounds of their legitimate legis-
than congressional employment practices. Neither the Court nor Congress has considered
the former deserving of protection. See United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501 (1972).
111. See id at 515-16.
112. United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. at 177 (Harlan, J.).
113. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2. The Supreme Court acknowledged Congress' broad
rule-making authority under Art. I, § 5, in United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 5 (1892). In
that case, the Court considered the validity of a House rule permitting the clerk to record
names of those members present but not voting. Noting that the Constitution empowers
each house to determine its procedural rules, the Court refused to question the advantages,
disadvantages, wisdom or folly of such a rule. Id at 5. Nevertheless, the Court warned that
Congress' rules may not contravene constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights.
Id
114. See SENATE COMM. ON RULES AND ADMINISTRATION, SUBCOMM. ON PRIVILEGES
AND ELECTIONS, SENATE ELECTION, EXPULSION AND CENSURE CASES FROM 1793 TO 1972,
S. Doc. No. 92-7, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1972); JOINT COMM. ON CONG. OPERATIONS, 93d
CONG., IST SESS., HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES EXCLUSION, CENSURE AND EXPULSION
CASES FROM 1789 TO 1973 (Comm. Print 1973). See generally, CONGRESSIONAL QUAR-
TERLY'S GUIDE TO CONGRESS 681-714 (2d ed. 1976). Congress has power under Art. I, § 5,
to censure or expel members for disorderly or improper conduct. For nearly two hundred
years Congress has used this power infrequently. Seven senators, eighteen representatives,
and one territorial delegate have been formally censured for misconduct. Fifteen senators
and three representatives have been expelled. Moreover, to avoid what it perceives to be
harsh measures, Congress has recently developed other methods of disciplining its members.
Members may be fined, stripped of committee chairmanships, reprimanded or denied the
right to vote. GUIDE TO CONGRESS at 681-714. The House Ethics Committee recommended
the lightest penalty possible for a member involved in the South Korean influence-buying
scandals. Charges against another member were dropped. See Wash. Post, Oct. 5, 1978,
§ A, at 1, col. 1. The full House voted to reprimand three members for their receipt of cash
contributions from South Korean businessman Tongsun Park. One reprimanded congress-
man called the "censure" "cruel and unusual punishment." Wash. Post, Oct. 14, 1978, § A,
at 7, col. 1.
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lative powers, inquiry into the misconduct is not proscribed by the speech
or debate clause, and external remedial measures have historically been
available. For example, Congress has broad power to conduct investiga-
tions and to punish for contempt. Its authority is not unlimited, however,
and the courts have not hesitated to sustain the rights of private individu-
als when Congress has overstepped the bounds of legitimate legislative ac-
tivity. In Marshall v. Gordon, 15 the Supreme Court acknowledged the
legitimacy of the contempt power, but held that in this instance the House
lacked constitutional justification to punish the person involved for con-
tempt. The individual had written and published an ill-tempered letter
about the actions and purposes of a subcommittee of a House Committee.
Since the letter was not calculated or likely to jeopardize the House's abil-
ity to carry out its legislative functions, the Court found the issuance of the
contempt citation to be an excessive use of its power.
Similarly, in McGrain v. Daugherty,'1 6 the Court held that the investiga-
tory authority does not grant Congress general powers to inquire into pri-
vate affairs and compel disclosures." 7 A witness may rightfully refuse to
answer a question when the bounds of the power are exceeded or the ques-
tions are not pertinent to the matter under inquiry because the Court has
declared that the Bill of Rights imposes special restraints upon congres-
sional investigations.' 18 Not every congressional investigation is justified
by a public need that outweighs private rights affected. Any such assump-
tion would "abdicate the responsibility placed by the Constitution upon
the judiciary to ensure that the Congress does not unjustifiably encroach
upon an individual's right to privacy nor abridge his liberty of speech,
press, religion, or assembly."' 19
The privilege from arrest afforded to members of Congress is also sub-
ject to stringent limitations. The Constitution shields members from arrest
while attending or traveling to or from a congressional session, except in
the case of "Treason, Felony, and Breach of the Peace."' 20 Since the
Court has interpreted the exceptions broadly to include all criminal of-
fenses,' 2' however, protection from arrest has been limited to civil cases.
115. 243 U.S. 521 (1916).
116. 273 U.S. 135 (1927).
117. Id at 173-74.
118. Id But see Hutchinson v. United States, 369 U.S. 599 (1962). In that case, the
Court found that the question the plaintiff refused to answer was clearly within the scope of
the committee's inquiry. The Court denied that it could judicially determine when a com-
mittee had acquired sufficient information for its legislative purposes. Id at 618-19.
119. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 198-99 (1957).
120. U.S. CoNsT. art I, § 6, cl. 1.
121. Williamson v. United States, 207 U.S. 425 (1907). According to a 1976 Justice De-
partment ruling, members of Congress are no longer immune from arrest in Washington,
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Furthermore, the privilege against civil arrest has been narrowed to ex-
clude protection from the service of process.' 22 As a result, members have
been accountable under a variety of criminal and some civil statutes.
While most statutes under which legislators have been held criminally lia-
ble specifically include members of Congress within the scope of their ap-
plication, senators and representatives may be held accountable under any
criminal law. ' 23
The bribery, fraud, and conflict of interest laws, which specifically in-
clude members within their coverage, are the most common statutes under
which members have been prosecuted.' 24 In Burton v. United States, 125 a
senator was found guilty of violating a statute prohibiting members from
receiving compensation from services rendered in matters before United
States departments or agencies. Since a senator may appear before an ex-
ecutive department provided he receives no compensation for his services,
the Court found that the statute neither encroached upon a senator's au-
thority nor interfered with his "legitimate functions, privileges, or
rights."'126 Similarly, in United States v. Brewster, Senator Brewster was
prosecuted on charges of soliciting and accepting a bribe in violation of
federal law. 127 The question before the Supreme Court was whether inves-
tigation of the bribe also involved the questioning of a legislative act. The
Court justified the Brewster inquiry by rejecting the notion that a bribe is
D.C. for crimes such as drunk driving and soliciting prostitution. When he announced the
ruling, former Washington Police Chief Cullinane said the nonarrest policy was based on a
"misinterpretation of the meaning" of the privilege from arrest clause. It was thought that
the more sweeping policy against arrest was to avoid offending the legislators, who con-
trolled the D.C. police department budget. GUIDE TO CONGRESS, supra note 114, at 714.
122. Long v. Ansel, 293 U.S. 76 (1934). When the Constitution was adopted, arrests in
civil suits were still common.
123. See discussion of United States v. Dowdy, 479 F.2d 213 (4th Cir.) cert. denied, 414
U.S. 823 (1973), note 129 infra.
124. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 203 (1976) (prohibiting compensation to members of Con-
gress, officers and others in matters affecting the government) with 18 U.S.C. § 1505 ("who-
ever" obstructs proceedings before departments or agencies) [and] United States v.
Bramblett, 348 U.S. 503 (1955), in which a former member of Congress was found guilty of
having falsely and fraudulently represented to the Disbursing Office of the House of Repre-
sentatives that a woman was entitled to compensation as his official clerk. Bramblett claimed
that the Disbursing Office was not a department or agency within the meaning of the law.
The Court held that within the purpose of the statute "department" described executive,
legislative, and judicial branches of government. Id at 509.
125. 202 U.S. 344 (1906).
126. Id at 367.
127. 408 U.S. at 502. Recently, particularly during the 95th Congress, there has been a
wave of criminal indictments brought against members of Congress. Representatives Flood,
Eilberg and Diggs, for example, were each charged with financial misconduct. See gener-
ally, Greider, Do We Want a Congress That's Clean?, Wash Post. Nov. 5, 1978, § D, at 1, ol.
1, for an incisive political commentary on the recent crop of congressional scandals.
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any part of the legislative process or function,' 28 or that any inquiry into
the purpose of a bribe impermissibly draws into question the legislative
acts of the member or his motives for performing them.' 29
The above cases illustrate that a key to congressional accountability is
the scope of the immunity provided by the speech or debate clause. If the
improper or illegal conduct occurred in the course of legislative activity,
accountability may be limited to internal congressional review procedures.
When Congress, through its investigatory powers, exceeds the scope of its
authority and violates an individual's constitutional rights, or when a
member violates a criminal or civil law, however, inquiry into and ac-
countability for that conduct is permissible so long as its proof does not
depend on privileged legislative activity.
Given this interpretation, congressional staffing decisions are not privi-
leged legislative actions. Accountability for discriminatory employment
practices therefore need not be limited to internal congressional proce-
dures. Whether such conduct can properly be regulated by statute and
thus subjected to judicial or administrative review, however, raises issues
128. 408 U.S. at 526. Accord, McSurely v. McClellan, 553 F.2d 1277 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en
banc), cert. dismissed, 438 U.S. 189 (1978). In McSurely two individuals sought damages
from a U.S. Senator and his aides for an alleged violation of the plaintiffs' constitutional
rights. The Court held that absent a showing of legislative purpose, distribution of photo-
copies of plaintiffs' private papers outside legislative channels was not legislative activity
entitled to absolute immunity under the speech or debate clause. The employment of an
unlawful means to implement an otherwise proper legislative objective was not, in the
Court's view, "essential to legislating." As with taking a bribe, the court found that resort to
criminal or unconstitutional methods of investigation is "no part of the legislative process or
function." Id. at 1288.
129. A member may only be prosecuted under a criminal statute if the government's case
does not rely on legislative acts or the motive for such acts. United States v. Johnson, 383
U.S. 169, 185. In United States v. Dowdy, 479 F.2d 213 (4th Cir.) cert. denied, 414 U.S. 823
(1973), the court held that the speech or debate clause does not bar a prosecution founded on
a general criminal statute which "does not draw into question the legislative acts of the
defendant member or his motives for performing them." 479 F.2d at 222. Similarly, in
Hoellen v. Annunzio, 468 F.2d 522 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 953 (1973), a con-
gressman's improper use of the franking privilege in violation of a civil statute was found
not protected by the speech or debate clause. The court reasoned that "it follows afortiori
from the holding in Brewster that if conduct by a Member of Congress which is outside the
sphere of purely legislative activity is not immunized from criminal prosecution, then con-
duct in that category is not immunized from injunctive relief." 468 F.2d at 527 n.8. In
United States ex. rel. Hollander v. Clay, 420 F. Supp. 853 (D.D.C. 1976), the court held
that the conduct of a member of Congress is generally not subjected to judicial review or
made the basis of civil or criminal judgments when that conduct is within the sphere of
legitimate legislative activity. "The constituent communications aspect [of falsified travel
vouchers] does not constitute the type of activity defined by the cases to be within the
clause." 420 F.Supp. at 856. See generally Reinstein and Silverglate, supra note 88, at 1146
(assault and battery or armed robbery should be beyond the scope of the privilege even if
fortuitously committed within the walls of the Capitol).
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similar to those considered in United States v. Brewster.130
In Brewster, the Court observed that when Congress specifically extends
statutory accountability to its members, the potential for harassment or
intrusion by a coordinate branch is not a threat sufficiently real to warrant
absolute congressional immunity.' 3' In the context of the federal bribery
laws, the Court noted that although Congress was free to exempt its mem-
bers from these laws if the potential for harassment so required, Congress
had made no effort to do so in the more than one hundred years since the
enactment of the laws. The Court not only considered the possibility of
harassment to be remote, but also suggested that it must be balanced
against the potential danger flowing from the absence of a bribery statute
applicable to members of Congress.' 32 The Court reasoned that the pur-
pose of the speech or debate clause was not only to protect the individual
legislator, but also to preserve the independence and integrity of the legis-
lative process. Abuses, such as financial misconduct involving bribery,
would do more, in the Court's opinion, to undermine legislative integrity
and defeat the right of the public to honest representation than would any
assertion of executive power to enforce these laws. 133 Depriving the execu-
tive and the judiciary of the power to investigate and punish bribery, the
Court concluded, was unlikely to enhance legislative independence. ' 34
Underlying the Court's position is the notion that accepting a bribe in
exchange for a vote is so repugnant to the integrity of the legislative proc-
ess that it must not be tolerated even at the risk of some intrusion into
protected legislative activity. Since employment discrimination is not re-
lated to protected legislative activity in the same way that taking a bribe is
related to voting, regulating such conduct need not raise the same concerns
for impermissible executive interference, and thus presents an easier case
for permitting some intrusion. Moreover, if the possibility of harassment
must be balanced against the potential dangers to the integrity of the sys-
tem in the case of a law having a greater potential for intrusion into pro-
tected activity, surely a similar balance must be struck in determining the
appropriateness of applying the employment laws to Congress. It seems
apparent that if the risk of some intrusion must be tolerated to regulate
conduct possibly related to a legislative act, if the conduct at issue is not a
130. 408 U.S. 501 (1972). Former Senator Daniel Brewster was indicted on charges of
soliciting and accepting a bribe in exchange for his actions on legislation proposing changes
in postal rates. The indictment was brought under 18 U.S.C. §§ 201(c)(1) and (g), provisions
specifically applicable to acts of bribery by members of Congress.
131. 408 U.S. at 524.
132. Id
133. Id at 524-25.
134. Id at 525.
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legislative activity within the meaning of the speech or debate clause, then
there can be no risk of intrusion and no need to exempt Congress from the
law. Even if it could be argued that employment decisions require the
same degree of protection as voting,135 the violation of individual constitu-
tional rights involved must be considered at least as damaging to the integ-
rity of the legislative system as buying votes. 136 One federal court of
appeals has agreed with this analysis, finding that speech or debate clause
immunity does not protect a congressman from liability for discriminating
against a member of his staff.
V. 4 VIS v PASSMAN. A CASE OF CONGRESSIONAL EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION
In January, 1974, Shirley Davis was Deputy Administrative Assistant to
Representative Otto E. Passman. Davis' employment was terminated in
July, 1974. A dismissal letter from the Representative stated, "you are
able, energetic and a very hard worker. . . . [H]owever, on account of the
unusually heavy workload in my Washington office, and the diversity of
the job, I concluded that it was essential that the understudy to my admin-
istrative assistant be a man."' 137 Davis sued Passman, claiming his action
violated the equal protection component of the fifth amendment's due
process clause, and seeking specific relief, damages, and declaratory re-
lief. 138 Passman moved to dismiss the complaint on three grounds: first,
135. See note 75 supra, for a discussion of the view that employment decisions are as
central a legislative function as voting.
136. See Reinstein and Silverglate, supra note 88, at 1174-75. According to the authors,
when an individual's constitutional rights are pitted against an assertion of legislative privi-
lege, courts should exercise their jurisdiction and consider redress for the individuals. Thus
operation of the speech or debate clause should differ according to whether it is asserted
against executive intrusions or against legislative invasions of individual rights. Id See also
Note, The Speech or Debate Clause as a Defense in Private Civil Suits, 10 GA. L. REV. 953,
954 (1976) (the use of the speech or debate clause as an obstruction to private civil suits is
not warranted by the history or original purpose of the clause); Comment, supra note 89, at
807, 814 (unconstitutional activity is, by definition, not within the "legitimate legislative
sphere" since constitutional rights are paramount to an assertion of congressional immu-
nity).
137. Davis v. Passman, 544 F.2d 865, 867 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 99 S. Ct. 308
(1978).
138. Id at 868. Davis' action was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) which pro-
vides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation custom or us-
age, or any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action of law, suit in equity, or other proper pro-
ceeding for redress.
Davis alleged a violation of her constitutional rights by an agent of the federal government
and therefore was precluded from using section 1983. See District of Columbia v. Carter,
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that his conduct was not unconstitutional; second, that the law afforded
Davis no private right of action; and third, that the doctrines of sovereign
and official immunity barred the suit. The district court rejected the im-
munity argument, but dismissed the action on the first two grounds. 139
A panel of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding
that Davis' allegations, if proven, would establish a constitutional violation
for which she would have a private right of action. 140 At the outset, the
panel noted that sex discrimination by the federal government violates the
equal protection component of the fifth amendment's due process
clause.' 4 ' Davis' allegations, the panel found, established a prima facie
case of sex discrimination, even though the discrimination was not pursu-
ant to a statutory classification. 142 Furthermore, Representative Passman
offered the panel no governmental interest in support of his action, nor was
the panel able to imagine one.143 Having determined that Davis alleged a
409 U.S. 418 (1972), in which the Supreme Court reviewed the legislative history of § 1983
and determined that the District of Columbia was not a "state or Territory" within the
meaning of the statute. Id at 424. The court ruled that the statute does not extend to purely
private conduct and, with the exception of the Territories, actions of the federal government
and its officers are facially exempt from its proscriptions. Id at 424-25.
139. The United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana, in an un-
printed opinion, held that Davis did not state a claim against Passman upon which relief
could be granted. The discharge of plaintiff on alleged grounds of sex discrimination, ac-
cording to the court, was not violative of the fifth amendment because the law affords the
plaintiff no private right of action for this claim. The court was of the opinion, however, that
the doctrines of sovereign and official immunity urged by defendant as grounds for dis-
missing the action were not well founded. Davis v. Passman, No. 74-745, Slip op. at 53
(W.D. La. Feb. 26, 1975).
140. 544 F.2d at 868.
141. Id The panel noted that although the fourteenth amendment's equal protection
clause applies only to the states, the fifth amendment's due process clause contains an equal
protection component applicable to the federal government. Id citing Boiling v. Sharpe,
347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954). Further, the panel relied on Supreme Court decisions to assert that
just as sex discrimination by the states violates the fourteenth amendment unless supported
by sufficient justification, sex discrimination by the federal government violates the fifth
amendment. 544 F.2d at 868 citing Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975), and
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
142. 544 F.2d at 869. Under 2 U.S.C. § 92, a representative may dismiss a member of his
or her staff with or without cause. Although this statute is nondiscriminatory on its face,
equal protection principles apply to the discriminatory application of a facially neutral stat-
utes. 544 F.2d at 869 citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). The court further
reasoned that in determining whether a facially nondiscriminatory statute has been adminis-
tered in a manner violative of equal protection, the question to be answered is whether
"there is shown to be present in it an element of intentional or purposeful discrimination."
Id citing Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1 (1944). The court found that Passman's termina-
tion letter established a prima facie case of "intentional" and "purposeful" discrimination in
employment based on sex as a class. 544 F.2d at 870.
143. 544 F.2d at 871. The court acknowledged that the need for "wide discretion in staff
employment decision(s] cannot be ignored, but the constitutional proscription of blatant sex
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constitutional violation, the panel next examined whether the claim was
one upon which relief could be granted.
The specific relief Davis sought included reinstatement, promotion, and
an injunction against unlawful discrimination against her. The panel
found that the injunction claim might raise a sovereign immunity issue
even though the doctrine does not bar complaints against federal officials
which allege unconstitutional behavior. 44 Additionally, although the re-
instatement and promotion prayers would not be amenable to sovereign
immunity attack, these demands were likely to raise difficult issues con-
cerning the proper exercise of equitable remedial discretion. The panel
was hesitant to order reinstatement of a representative's personal assis-
tant.145 Intervening events diminished the importance of these issues since
Representative Passman was defeated in his primary election and would
no longer be a member of Congress.
The panel then analyzed several issues to determine the availability of
damages. First, it found that damages were available under Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics,146 in which
the Supreme Court held that a damage remedy for unconstitutional search
and seizure by federal officials could be implied directly from the Consti-
tution. 147 Although Davis' claim arose under the fifth amendment, rather
than the fourth as in Bivens, the panel could find no basis in Bivens' lan-
guage or rationale for according any significance to the distinction because
the "rights protected by the fifth amendment due process clause are every
bit as fundamental as fourth amendment rights."' 4 8 The panel found the
case for implying a constitutional damages remedy especially compelling
when, as in Davis' case, there was no meaningful alternative remedy.' 49
Second, the panel noted that a previous Supreme Court decision, Brown v.
discrimination does not impair Rep. Passman's legitimate control over his staff to any extent
at all." Id at 870.
144. Id at 871-72.
145. Id at 872.
146. 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Bivens involved an allegedly unconstitutional search and
seizure by federal agents. Petitioner claimed that FBI agents entered his apartment and
arrested him for alleged narcotics violations, manacled petitioner in front of his wife and
children, and searched the entire apartment. Id at 389. The Court concluded that peti-
tioner's complaint stated a cause of action under the fourth amendment, and held him enti-
tled to recover money damages for injuries suffered as a result of the agents' violation of his
fourth amendment rights. Id at 345.
147. See note 146 supra. In Davis, as in Bivens, there is no specific federal statutory
provision for relief. See generally note 138 supra.
148. 544 F.2d at 873. The panel listed various courts of appeals' decisions supporting its
concluscion that Bivens is not limited to fourth amendment claims. See also Brief for Ap-
pellant at 16.
149. 544 F.2d at 873. In the Bivens case, state tort law was available to remedy some
constitutional violations, and the exclusionary rule was also available. Id
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General Services Administration, 50 did not dictate a contrary result. In
Brown, the Court held that the thirty day limitation on bringing Title VII
employment discrimination suits against the federal government could not
be circumvented by the simple expedient of bringing the action directly
under the Constitution and the Bivens remedies rule. The panel observed
that because Title VII excludes the staffs of members of Congress, Ms.
Davis never had a Title VII remedy available to her. Brown only estab-
lishes Title VII as the exclusive judicial remedy for federal employment
discrimination to which Title VII extends, but does not affect remedies for
employees not protected by that statute. 151
Ultimately, the panel examined the various immunity doctrines raised
by Passman as bars to the action. It found Davis' claim to be against Pass-
man as an individual, not against an official of the United States, and
therefore dismissed the claim of sovereign immunity. 152 Further, the panel
concluded that representatives are not immune under the speech or debate
clause from inquiry into their decisions to dismiss staff members because
"when members dismiss employees they are neither legislating nor formu-
lating legislation."' 53 Passman also claimed protection under the doctrine
of absolute official immunity which protects federal government officials
from civil damage suits. Passman was precluded from asserting this im-
munity because it is coextensive with the speech or debate clause. 54 Fi-
nally, the panel examined the doctrine of qualified immunity to determine
whether the need to afford members broad discretion in their staffing deci-
sions warranted the application of qualified immunity for legislators.
Qualified immunity differs from absolute official immunity in that it does
not totally preclude an action against an official; at trial the official must
demonstrate that he or she acted in good faith and nonmaliciously. The
panel concluded that a violation of constitutional rights could not be justi-
150. 425 U.S. 820 (1976).
151. 544 F.2d at 874. The panel relied upon Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88
(1976), decided the same day as Brown, in which a Civil Service Commission rule excluding
aliens from most federal employment was held invalid despite Title VII's silence on the
subject of discrimination against aliens.
152. 544 F.2d at 877.
153. Id at 880. For judicial interpretations and history of the clause see notes 95-106 and
accompanying text supra.
154. 544 F.2d at 881. Absolute immunity extends only to certain key government offi-
cials, and then only when they are performing official duties. It extends to prosecutors when
they are prosecuting, and judges when they are judging. Id at 881 citing Imbler v.
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976), and Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967). The panel noted
that absolute official immunity also extends to legislators when they are legislating. But
legislators are not legislating when they dismiss staff members. For the same reasons that
staff dismissals are precluded from speech or debate clause protection, the panel denied
Representative Passman absolute immunity. Id at 881. See notes 182-87 infra.
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fled by ignorance or disregard of the law, 155 and sex discrimination by the
federal government, unsupported by legitimate justifications, was uncon-
stitutional. Representative Passman was precluded from maintaining a
good faith defense even under the liberal qualified immunity standard the
panel prescribed for congressional staffing decisions.' 56
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, rehearing the case en banc on Rep-
resentative Passman's petition, reversed the panel in part. 57 Focusing on
the portion of the panel's decision entitling Davis to money damages under
the due process clause of the fifth amendment, the court reasoned that:
first, the Constitution did not compel an action for money damages im-
plied from the due process clause; 158 second, Congress avoided creating an
action for money damages for congressional aides in noncompetitive posi-
tions;' 59 and third, implying such a damage action would necessarily draw
into the federal judicial system a wide range of cases, the resolution of
which Congress did not commit to the federal judiciary. 60
The court acknowledged that most circuits have allowed plaintiffs alleg-
ing similar invasions of their due process rights to recover money damages
under the Bivens rule. 16' It nevertheless found it necessary to employ a
two-step analysis to determine whether or not the Bivens remedy was ap-
propriate in this case. First, it reviewed the employment laws to determine
whether a damage action for congressional employees could be implied
155. 544 F.2d at 881. Even under the doctrine of absolute official immunity, a federal
official may not with impunity ignore the Constitution or any other law. See notes 182-93
and accompanying text infra.
156. 544 F.2d at 882.
157. 571 F.2d 793 (5th Cir. 1978).
158. Id at 800-01.
159. Id at 798.
160. Id at 800-01.
161. The court listed several circuits that have allowed plaintiffs to base Bivens implied
actions solely upon the concept of due process. See, e.g., Gentile v. Wallen, 562 F.2d 193,
196 (2d Cir. 1977) (teacher's claim of denial of due process by school board stated a cause of
action directly under the fourteenth amendment); Owen v. City of Independence, 560 F.2d
925, 932 (8th Cir. 1977) (discharged police chief has implied right of action for monetary
relief arising under fourteenth amendment); Jacobson v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency,
558 F.2d 928, 942 (9th Cir. 1977) (rights protected by fifth amendment due process give rise
to cause of action); Fitzgerald v. Porter Memorial Hospital, 523 F.2d 716, 718-19 & n.7 (7th
Cir. 1975) (denying relief, but holding action could be maintained directly under the four-
teenth amendment against public hospital for excluding father from delivery room); States
Marine Lines, Inc. v. Shultz, 498 F.2d 1146, 1156-57 (4th Cir. 1974) (claim of deprivation of
property in violation of constitutional rights is appropriate claim for money damages);
United States ex rel. Moore v. Koelzer, 457 F.2d 892, 894 (3rd Cir. 1972) (complaint alleging
violation of fourth and fifth amendment rights states a claim upon which relief can be
granted). The court noted that other circuits have "commented favorably upon extension of
Bivens to actions implied from the concept of due process". 571 F.2d at 795 n.4.
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from these statutes. 162 Second, if this initial inquiry did not suggest such
an implied action, it would determine whether the Constitution compelled
a damage remedy.163 In the first part of its analysis, the court looked to the
congressional intent behind employment protection legislation and de-
cided that Congress had specifically declined to create a cause of action for
money damages for congressional employees.164 Finding such an implied
cause of action, the court said, "would have the anomalous result of grant-
ing federal employees in non-competitive positions, whom Congress did
not intend to protect, a remedy far more extensive than Congress adopted
for federal employees in the competitive service, whom it did intend to
protect." 65 The court was also concerned that permitting this type of rem-
edy would require the federal judiciary to resolve cases previously not
committed to it.166 The court therefore declined to create a remedial right
under its federal common law powers.' 67 Under the second step of its
analysis, the court explored whether or not the Constitution compelled an
action for money damages implied from the fifth amendment's due process
clause. It concluded that it did not, reasoning, inter alia, that "not every
right conceivably wedged within the literal breadth of due process de-
mands federal protection through a cause of action for monetary dam-
ages."1 68
Judge Jones concurred in the result, basing his argument entirely on the
potential separation of powers problems resulting from permitting relief to
a congressional employee. He concluded that hiring and firing of congres-
sional aides was a legislative activity protected by the speech or debate
clause since aides serve as alter egos of the member employer. 69 Judge
162. Id at 798-800.
163. Id at 800-01.
164. Id at 798. The court suggested that in exempting its employees from Title VII,
Congress was adhering to the legislative judgment expressed in the statute according to
which member's personal staffs are removable "at anytime ... with or without cause." Id
quoting 2 U.S.C. § 92 (1970).
165. Id The court observed that when Congress amended Title VII to include federal
employees, the separate administrative remedy for discrimination in federal employment
was not extended to congressional employees who are not in the competitive service. Id.
Congressional employees are thus not entitled to the review in federal courts provided other
federal employees under section 717. Id
166. Id at 800.
167. Id The court compared the damage remedy provided by 42 U.S.C. § 1983 with a
remedy under the Constitution. See note 138 supra. In the court's opinion the "range of
interests protected by procedural due process is not infinite," regardless of any express statu-
tory mandate for a damage action. 571 F.2d at 800 citing Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
168. Id
169. Id at 801-02 (Jones, J., concurring). See note 75 supra for a discussion of the "alter-
ego" theory. The reasoning is particularly inapplicable to Shirley Davis who, Passman ac-
knowledged, was a secretary. In his termination letter to Davis, Passman expressed certainty
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Goldberg, the author of the panel opinion, wrote a lengthy dissent stating
that the "court today chooses to deny a right of action to the victim of as
blatant a case of gender-based discrimination as is within my experience
on this court."' 170 He rejected the court's Bivens analysis step by step, em-
phasizing that "where federally protected rights have been invaded, it has
been the rule from the beginning that courts will be alert to adjust their
remedies so as to grant the necessary relief."'' 7 1
VI. DAvis I AND II: No ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY FOR DISCRIMINATION BY
MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
The two important issues raised by Davis are first, whether members of
Congress who discriminate against their employees are protected from lia-
bility under any immunity theory, and second, assuming the action is not
barred, what remedies are available to the discrimination victim. After
Davis I and II, the answer to the first question appears to be that members
may be held accountable for acts of employment discrimination. But
whether a discrimination victim will have any meaningful remedy is un-
certain after Davis II. The Supreme Court will have an opportunity to
decide both issues when it hears the Davis case this term.
The damage remedy announced by the Court in Bivens arose primarily
from the fourth amendment's proscription of unreasonable searches and
seizures. 172 In a concurring opinion, Justice Harlan noted that the mone-
tary relief created by the majority was a permissible form of redress in a
claim arising under the fourth amendment, but not one that would neces-
sarily apply to other types of constitutionally protected interests. He sug-
gested that the appropriateness of money damages may vary with the
nature of the personal interest asserted. 173 While a number of federal
courts have been unwilling to extend Bivens to cases not involving the
fourth amendment, an overwhelming number of lower federal courts have
extended or have indicated their willingness to extend the Bivens doctrine
beyond fourth amendment claims. 174 Both the majority and the dissent in
Davis II acknowledged this pattern. The Fifth Circuit itself, prior to
that some organization would need an "extremely capable secretary," and awareness that
"secretaries with [Davis'] ability" were in demand. 544 F.2d at 867-68 n. 1. As a secretary, it
is unlikely that Davis would perform any legislative acts entitling her to immunity coexten-
sive with Passman's.
170. 571 F.2d at 805 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
171. Id at 810 quoting 403 U.S. 388, 392 (1971) citing, inter alia, Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S.
678, 684 (1946).
172. 403 U.S. at 397. See note 146 supra.
173. 403 U.S. at 408-09.
174. Lehman, Bivens and its Progeny. The Scope of a Constitutional Cause ofActionfor
Torts Committed by Government Officials, 4 HAST. L. Q. 531, 566-67 (1977). But see Butz v.
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Davis, had extended Bivens remedies to cases involving other amend-
ments. 75 One explanation for the court's refusal to extend the remedy to
Davis may be the political sensitivities associated with imposing liability
on a member of a coordinate branch. Yet it is interesting that the majority
in Davis II was willing to consider reinstatement as a remedy had Passman
still been in office. 176 Ironically, Judge Goldberg, speaking for the panel in
Davis 1, was concerned that this type of remedy would be inappropriately
intrusive. 177 What the court in fact would have done had Passman been
re-elected remains unclear.
What can be said with increased certainty after Davis I and II is that
members of Congress may be held accountable for acts of employment
discrimination. Since the district court rejected the immunity arguments
and the court of appeals in Davis II reversed only that portion of the panel
decision permitting a damages remedy, the panel opinion provides the ra-
tionale for this view. The panel held that employment discrimination suits
will not be barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity, provided the
action is brought against the member in his or her individual capacity.
Nor will they be barred under the doctrines of absolute executive/official
immunity or speech or debate clause immunity. The panel analyzed the
history of the speech or debate clause and concluded that representatives
are not immune from inquiry into their employment decisions because
such conduct involves neither legislating nor formulating legislation. 78
Relying on Gravel v. United States,179 the panel determined that dismissal
decisions are not an integral part of the deliberative and communicative
processes by which members participate in committee and House proceed-
ings.' 80 While the Constitution establishes an immunity for aberrations in
a representative's legislative activities, "Members of Congress become
Economou, 98 S. Ct. 2894 (1978) (specifically reserving the question of whether Bivens ex-
tends beyond the fourth amendment).
175. 571 F.2d at 796. The court acknowledged its own decision extending Bivens to fifth
amendment claims. See, e.g., Weir v. Muller, 527 F.2d 872 (5th Cir. 1976), in which plaintiff
alleged a deprivation of his fifth amendment right to due process during an investigation
leading to his conviction for federal income tax evasion. The court held that the district
court erred in finding no jurisdiction to consider damage claims based upon implied causes
of action under the fifth amendment's due process clause. But see Rodriguez v. Ritchey, 556
F.2d 1185, 1192 (5th Cir. 1977) (en banc court declined to rule on appropriateness of extend-
ing Bivens).
176. 571 F.2d at 800. The court maintained that its refusal to imply a cause of action for
money damages does not render the constitutional rights of congressional employees mean-
ingless because "[a] plaintiff might still seek equitable relief where the employer remained in
office." Id.
177. 544 F.2d at 872.
178. Id at 800.
179. 408 U.S. 606 (1972).
180. 544 F.2d at 880.
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mere mortals when they operate in more mundane fields."''
The panel also held that the inapplicability of speech or debate clause
protection foreclosed a member from asserting an absolute official immu-
nity because one privilege was coextensive with the other. In Barr v.
Matteo, 182 a libel action against an agency official brought by former em-
ployees of the Office of Rent Stabilization, Justice Harlan explained that
absolute official immunity developed as a means for officers of the govern-
ment to defend themselves against civil damage suits for defamation and
other torts.' 83 He characterized suits against government officials as con-
fficts between the need to protect individual citizens from damages and the
public interest involved in shielding responsible government officers from
the harassment of vindictive or ill-found damage Suits. 184 He noted, how-
ever, that the decisions have always limited immunity to action within the
scope of the official's powers. The Court underscored that the privilege is
not "a badge or emolument of exalted office, but an expression of a policy
designed to aid in the effective functioning of government."' 85
Although there are apparently no cases holding executive branch immu-
nity available to legislators, the Justice Department, in an amicus brief
filed on behalf of Representative Passman in Davis II, argued that staffing
decisions are essential to a member's official functions and should be pro-
tected by the absolute official immunity described in Barr. 86 The Court
in Barr, however, clearly equated the judicially developed doctrine of offi-
cial immunity with the constitutional privilege of speech or debate.' 87 In
Doe v. McMillan, 88 when it was argued that federal legislators were enti-
tled to official immunity for publishing and disseminating a report alleg-
edly violative of plaintiffs' rights to privacy, the Court explained that any
official immunity available to legislators was equivalent to the immunity
available under the speech or debate clause.' 89
Moreover, after the Court's recent decision in Butz v. Economou, 190 it is
unlikely that immunity will protect employment decisions such as Pass-
181. Id.
182. 360 U.S. 564 (1959).
183. Id. at 569. Absolute official immunity, Justice Harlan explained, is "largely of judi-
cial making, although the Constitution itself gives an absolute privilege to members of both
Houses of Congress in respect to any speech, debate, vote, report, or action done in session."
Id. at 569.
184. Id at 564-65.
185. Id. at 572-73.
186. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 7-11, Davis v. Passman, 544 F.2d
865 (5th Cir. 1977).
187. 360 U.S. at 569 (dictum).
188. 412 U.S. 306 (1973). See note 67 supra for a discussion of the case.
189. Id. at 324.
190. 98 S. Ct. 2894 (1978).
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man's. Butz concerned a claim for damages against Department of Agri-
culture officials alleging that they had conducted an investigation and an
administrative proceeding against the plaintiff in retaliation for his criti-
cism of the agency. The district court dismissed the action, finding that the
individual federal officials were entitled to absolute immunity for all dis-
cretionary acts within the scope of their authority. The court of appeals
reversed, holding that the defendants were entitled only to the qualified
immunity available to their counterparts in state government.' 9' In af-
firming the decision of the court of appeals, the Supreme Court noted that
Barr did not purport to depart from the general rule prohibiting a federal
official from ignoring the limitations which the controlling law has placed
on his or her power. 192 The Court also noted that Barr did not protect an
official who not only committed a wrong under local law, but also violated
those fundamental principles of fairness embodied in the Constitution.
Since government officials are liable when they exceed their statutory au-
thority, they clearly may not willfully or knowingly violate constitutional
rights. 193 The Court concluded that in a suit for damages arising from
unconstitutional action, federal executive officials exercising discretion are
entitled only to qualified immunity. Thus, even if Passman could assert his
entitlement to the same executive immunity available to other federal gov-
ernment officials, it is clear after Butz that his claim would be limited to a
qualified, not absolute, immunity. Under the traditional qualified immu-
nity standard reaffirmed in Butz and relied upon in Davis, it is unlikely
that a congressperson could successfully assert even a qualified immunity
for a willful or knowing violation of an individual's constitutional rights.
VII. WHAT'S LEFT AFTER DAvis?
Although these decisions are not final, after Davis I and H, a member of
Congress can be sued for discriminating against a staff member. Depend-
ing on whether the Supreme Court affirms or reverses Davis II, however,
the employee may be without a remedy even in a proven case of discrimi-
nation. At least the action will not be dismissed at the outset based upon
an assertion of legislative immunity if the Court lets the three lower court
opinions stand. If the action against the member is not barred, the ration-
ale for excluding congressional employees from remedies available to
other workers under the employment protection laws is no longer valid.
Whether congressional employees will ever benefit from these protections
191. Economou v. United States Dep't. of Agriculture, 535 F.2d 688 (2d Cir. 1976).
192. 98 S. Ct. at 2902.
193. Id at 2905.
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is questionable, however, in view of the sensitive political and policy con-
siderations at play.
A. Congressional Employment Safeguards. Alternative Enforcement
Procedures
Unlike other citizens who freely lobby the Congress to enact laws of
special interest to them, the traditional elements of the legislative process
are not available to Capitol Hill staff.1 94 Many victims of congressional
employment discrimination are unwilling to demand the necessary re-
forms for fear of losing their jobs. Some employees acquiesce to and
others actually condone current practices because of the benefits gained
from going along with the system. It is almost impossible for congres-
sional employees to enlist outside support on this issue because some past
supporters of employment protection laws are unwilling to jeopardize
other measures for which they are lobbying.' 95 Fundamentally, the
problems of Capitol Hill employees are not of great concern to the public
at large. Congressional jobs are associated with status, glamour, special
privileges, and large salaries. It is unlikely that a member would lose more
than a handful of votes among his or her electorate for voting against em-
ployment protections for Hill workers.' 96 Notwithstanding these difficul-
ties, several preliminary steps in the direction of reform have been taken.
To assure that this momentum is not lost, alternative methods of protect-
ing congressional employees should be examined, taking into considera-
tion both the preceding discussion of legislative immunity and the political
realities inseparable from this issue.
Rules prohibiting employment discrimination are already in effect in
both the House and Senate. The remaining task is to devise an enforce-
ment mechanism that will both protect congressional employees and be
sufficiently unobtrusive to the legislators who must sanction it. The alter-
natives fall along a broad spectrum: complete coverage under existing law
for all congressional employees; complete coverage under existing law for
a select group of congressional employees; limited coverage under existing
law; no coverage under existing law, but an independent enforcement
194. The Constitution grants Congress alone the power to legislate. Congress cannot be
ordered to pass any law, nor can rules of conduct be externally imposed upon it. U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 1, cl. 1.
195. 36 CONG. Q. 337 (1978).
196. The lack of political liability attached to this issue is evident from the Senate's deci-
sion to remove S. Res. 431, from the calendar of measures to be considered prior to the close
of the 95th Congress, and its unwillingness to amend Humphrey-Hawkins to include it. See
note 85 supra.
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mechanism with an internal appeals process; and finally, a completely in-
ternal and voluntary system.
.1 Complete Coverage Under Existing Lawfor Congressional Employees
In the 95th Congress, a bill was introduced in the Senate to extend ex-
isting employment protection laws to Congress. 197 The argument for this
approach is that since employment practices are not protected by the
speech or debate clause, members can be sued when they discriminate.
Congress has not exempted itself from the bribery laws for fear of intru-
sion or harassment by the executive branch even though accepting a bribe
in exchange for a vote is closely related to the legislative process. Bribery
'may appear to more directly detract from the integrity of the legislative
process, but a strong argument can be made that invasion of constitutional
rights resulting from employment discrimination deserves equal statutory
sanctions.
On the other hand, even if the speech or debate clause does not bar an
action against a member, thereby eliminating potential separation of pow-
ers problems, Congress arguably should not be compelled to follow the
commands of the executive branch in an area as sensitive as employment
relations. Although such interference may be constitutionally permissible,
it could negatively impact upon the compatible operation of the three
branches of government, and for that reason should not be contemplated.
In the context of a discussion of judicial supremacy, Judge Learned Hand
observed that constitutions must be interpreted to incorporate those unex-
pressed provisions necessary to "prevent the defeat of the venture at
hand." In his view, the Supreme Court appropriately assumes authority to
keep the states, Congress, and the President within their prescribed pow-
ers, but since judicial power is not constitutionally mandated, it need be
exercised only when a court deems it appropriate to do so. 98 According to
this theory, even though employment discrimination by members of Con-
gress may invade the constitutionally protected rights of some persons, the
consequences of exercising a court's power of judicial review should not be
risked. While a narrow view of legislative immunity may permit congres-
sional accountability under the employment laws, such day to day interfer-
ence in the operations of the legislature - whether or not such acts are
integrally related to the legislative process - may be too destructive of the
"venture at hand." 199
197. S. 3086, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. REc. S7567 (daily ed. May 16, 1978). See
note 86 and accompanying text supra.
198. L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 11-15 (1958).
199. Id
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2 Complete Coverage Under Existing Law for Some Congressional
Employees
The Supreme Court has extended legislative immunity to congressional
aides performing acts similar to those afforded protection if performed by
members of Congress.2°° This extension of the privilege to aides evoked
the argument that legislators should be insulated from inquiry into their
dealings with their "alter egos."'20 Although the argument prevents mem-
bers from discriminating against their aides with impunity, it also pre-
cludes executive branch involvment in employment decisions relating to
those aides who perform sensitive legislative and political tasks for their
legislator-employers. This claim of "peculiar sensitivities" has little rele-
vance, however, for those aides in clerical and support positions, and no
relevance for those persons not employed by individual members. An al-
ternative enforcement scheme, therefore, may involve extending complete
coverage of the employment laws to only some congressional employees.
Although individual determinations of coverage could prove difficult, the
problem is not insurmountable. Employees who provide services to the
entire Congress do not serve as "alter egos" of anyone. Thus it would not
intrude on a member's personal employment decisions to require the safe-
guards of existing law for these employees. A more difficult problem ex-
ists, however, for personal office staff or committee appointments. Non-
uniform extension of coverage in those cases could prove infeasible. Pro-
tection could also work to disadvantage those persons hoping to be pro-
moted from lower to higher level positions.
3. Limited Coverage Under Existing Law
Two possiblities exist in this category: complete coverage under the em-
ployment laws, enforced by a separate office within the Civil Service Com-
mission to handle congressional complaints; and limited coverage
patterned after the employment protections afforded Library of Congress
employees.
Under the first proposal, congressional employees would receive all the
protections of the current employment laws, but a separate office would be
established within the Civil Service Commission to handle their com-
plaints. To assure minimal intrusion by the executive branch, Congress
could appoint members of an independent panel within the separate office
structure to review complaints.
The second proposal would parallel the procedure established for Li-
brary of Congress employees under section 717 of the Civil Rights Act.
200. Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972).
201. See notes 75 and 169 supra for discussion of the "alter ego" theory.
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This section was added primarily to guarantee that all personnel actions
affecting federal government employment were free from discrimination;
secondly, to empower and require the Civil Service Commission to evalu-
ate and enforce federal agency equal employment opportunity plans and
programs; and thirdly, to provide remedies in federal district courts for any
employee who had exhausted the complaint procedure within his federal
agency.202 Although Library of Congress employees were initially ex-
cluded from section 717, it was amended prior to its enactment to grant
Library employees the nondiscrimination protection of subsection (a), and
the right to federal district court redress under subsection (c). Enforce-
ment procedures of subsection (b) were withheld. 20 3 Instead, administra-
tive and enforcement authority was delegated to the Librarian of
Congress. A similar solution for congressional employees would not sat-
isfy those who reject internal enforcement mechanisms, but it would at
least provide congressional employees with a remedy in the federal courts,
a critical element after Davis v. Passman.
2°4
4. An Independent Enforcement Mechanism
Independent enforcement was encompassed in S. Res. 431. The resolu-
tion would establish personnel guidelines, grievance procedures, and an
independent board to review complaints. The drawback of this approach
is that it permits an internal appeal to the Senate Ethics Committee,
thereby placing enforcement in the hands of the same persons whose con-
duct is being regulated. Although this procedure dispenses with problems
of intrusiveness involved in any external mechanisms, obvious disadvan-
tages exist to permitting Congressional self-policing. The Constitution's
"housekeeping" provision has rarely provoked punishment of members for
acts of misconduct.20 5 Moreover, as the Supreme Court noted in United
States v. Brewster,2°6 which considered application of bribery laws to fed-
eral legislators, definite risks are involved in permitting congressional self-
discipline. The Court observed that if Congress were responsible for over-
seeing activities of its members related to the legislative function, the "in-
dependence of individual members might actually be impaired.
'207
202. 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16 (1976). See also 118 CONG. REC. 4921 (1972) (remarks of Sena-
tor Cranston).
203. The drafters believed that including the Library under the enforcement authorities
of the Civil Service Commission would raise substantial questions about the appropriateness
of the Congress' delegating to an executive agency the legislative function of overseeing one
of its own arms. Id
204. 571 F.2d 793 (5th Cir. 1978).
205. See note 114 supra for a discussion of Congress' self-disciplining activities.
206. 408 U.S. 501 (1972).
207. Id. at 519. See The Bribed Congressman's Immunityfrom Prosecution, 75 YALE L.J.
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Congressional self-discipline, the Court stressed, will not invoke the pro-
tective shields present in a criminal bribery case.208 The Court concluded
that it could not be assumed that "the triers would be wholly objective and
free from considerations of party politics and the passions of the mo-
ment." 2°9 Political alliances may be the most important argument against
any internal congressional employment safeguard. The unwillingness of
members to adopt the mild enforcement procedure embodied in S. Res.
431 may be a forewarning of their inability to seriously and responsibly
regulate their own conduct in this area.
5. A Completely Internal, Voluntary Grievance Mechanism
A final alternative, one currently in effect in the House, is an internal,
voluntary mechanism. Unlike S. Res. 431, which has a mandatory griev-
ance and review procedure and becomes internal at the appeals stage, the
Voluntary Fair Employment Practices Agreement has no enforcement au-
thority and depends strictly on the cooperation of individual members.
This alternative has the advantage of being completely unintrusive, but
has the disadvantage of voluntary compliance and an internal review pro-
cedure.
B. Remedies Available to Congressional Employees in the Absence of
Statutory Safeguards
In view of the lack of statutory safeguards for congressional employees,
and in the absence of any internal procedures for enforcing House and
Senate anti-discrimination rules, the question remains whether any causes
of action are available to discrimination victims. Section 1 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1871, the predecessor of section 1983, was enacted for the
express purpose of enforcing the fourteenth amendment and is thus the
provision under which most discrimination actions are brought.210 Section
1983 provides a remedy only to those persons whose federal rights have
been violated under color of state law, however, and, as Davis v. Passman
illustrates, has no application to cases of federal employment discrimina-
335, 349 (1965) (a court trial provides an accused congressman with the benefit of constitu-
tional protections); Comment, The Constitutional Limits of the Speech or Debate Clause, 25
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 796, 817 (1978) (the courts are better equipped to impartially consider
questions of improper behavior by legislators because they are insulated from the political
process and enforce procedural safeguards).
208. 408 U.S. at 519. See Wash. Post, October 25, 1978, § A at 2, col. 1. In a confronta-
tion with the former special counsel of the Senate Ethics Committee, Senator Edward
Brooke told the committee chairman, "I'd rather be before a grand jury or a court of law.
My rights would be protected. I have no rights here." Id at col. 3.
209. 408 U.S. at 519-20.
210. See generally note 138 supra for a discussion of § 1983.
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tion. Davis had no choice but to bring her action under the fifth amend-
ment and to rely on Bivens for monetary relief. A congressional employee
may be able to avoid the Bivens dilemma by bringing an action under
section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1870.211 Although this provision is
limited to racial discrimination, 21 2 it may provide an appropriate cause of
action for a congressional employee because it is not limited to state ac-
tion.21 3 While it may be argued, as it was in Davis, that Brown v. General
Services Administration21 4 would preclude such an action, Brown only es-
tablished Title VII as the exclusive judicial remedy for federal employ-
ment discrimination to which Title VII applied. 215 Employees who are
outside the protection of that statute and who allege racial discrimination
may be able to bring an action under section 1981. Congressional employ-
ees who allege sex discrimination, however, would still be forced to rely
upon the fifth amendment and Bivens.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Unlike their counterparts in both the public and private sectors, Capitol
Hill employees continue to work without the protections of any employ-
ment laws. This situation persists because many members of Congress in-
sist that application of the employment laws to congressional employees is
constitutionally precluded by the doctrines of separation of powers and
legislative immunity. Employment decisions fall squarely outside the
speech or debate clause's protection, however, under the Supreme Court's
recent opinions regarding the scope of protected legislative activities. One
211. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976) provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in
every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give
evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the
security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be sub-
ject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every
kind, and to no other.
212. Section 1981 has not been limited to allegations of racial discrimination by blacks
alone, but has been held available to whites who are allegedly victims of racial discrimina-
tion. In McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Trans. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 285-96 (1975), the Supreme
Court held § 1981 applicable to racial discrimination in private employment against white
persons as well as non-whites. Id
213. See generall, C. ANTIEAU, FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHT ACTS § 16 (1971). Section 1981
finds constitutional support not only in the fourteenth amendment, but also in the thirteenth
amendment, and the Article One power of Congress over the District of Columbia and the
Territories. The latter constitutional provisions are not limited to "state action" and accord-
ingly § 1981 cases need not be limited to state action or color of law. Id
214. 425 U.S. 820 (1976).
215. See text accompanying notes 150-51 supra. Although Brown would preclude the
action brought under section 1981 in McDonald, it has no impact on the general availability
of § 1981 to whites alleging racial discrimination.
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federal court of appeals has refused to allow a congressman to bar an em-
ployment discrimination suit based on a claim of speech or debate clause
immunity. Notwithstanding these decisions, congressional employees re-
main "second class citizens" in the context of employment safeguards.
In an effort to come to terms with what some members have acknowl-
edged to be the legitimate complaints of congressional employees, while at
the same time preserving a perceived need for noninterference in its inter-
nal affairs by a coordinate branch, both the House and Senate are taking
small steps to afford their employees minimal employment protections.
Among the alternative procedures for providing Capitol Hill employees
with some remedy for acts of employment discrimination, at least three
possibilities have reasonable chances for passage. With the exception of
the two poles--complete coverage under existing law and a completely
voluntary, internal procedure-there are alternatives sufficiently limited to
alleviate members' fears of executive intrusion or harassment. The fact
that an employment discrimination action against a member is constitu-
tionally permissible does not eliminate the need for an enforcement mech-
anism. Presently, an employee who has successfully brought a sex
discrimination action under the fifth amendment may remain without any
remedy other than the satisfaction of having had her day in court, al-
though the Supreme Court may change this result. Since ultimately the
passage of employment protections for congressional employees will de-
pend on the conscience of the Congress, employees may be well advised to
test actions based upon racial discrimination under section 1981 and to
bring other sex discrimination actions under the fifth amendment in the
hopes of a favorable ruling on a damages remedy.
Allison Beck
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